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such as product design, advertising, marketing and distribution, and a corresponding 
reduction in the share of blue collar workers. 
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One of the main drivers of European integration was the idea that a more integrated
European economy would promote economic e±ciency, allowing countries to fully exploit
their competitive advantages, fostering factor mobility and increasing allocational e±ciency
(European Commission 1993). The euro was a crucial milestone along this path. Ten years
after its launch, we can start to assess the e®ects of such a radical institutional change. In
this paper, we focus on whether the introduction of the euro { narrowly de¯ned as the end
of competitive devaluations { has induced signi¯cant changes in the productive structure of
the euro area (EA) member states.2
When the euro was introduced in 1999, the European productive structure was sharply
di®erentiated across member states, with a group of southern countries specialized in tra-
ditional, low-human-capital activities. Firms in these countries took advantage of recur-
rent devaluations to cope with international competition, especially from the low wage
economies. The basic idea underlying our analysis is that the end of competitive devalua-
tions should have had di®erential e®ects by country and sector. For one thing, before the
introduction of the euro, countries had adopted di®erent strategies in terms of devaluation
vis-a-vis the Deutsche mark (DM) (Giavazzi & Giovannini 1989). Second, in some sectors
competition is mainly in prices, so changes in the terms of trade are a fundamental determi-
nant of performance; in other sectors, product di®erentiation is more pronounced, so prices
are just one factor of competitiveness, alongside product quality, brand name, technological
content, etc.. Our initial hypothesis is that the euro should have been a greater shock for
the sectors competing mostly in prices and the countries that made a more intense use of
competitive devaluations. We therefore expect that restructuring has been more intense in
1Prepared for the NBER Conference on Europe and the Euro, October 17 & 18, 2008. We have bene-
¯ted from discussions and comments from Alberto Alesina, Tito Boeri, Andrea Brandolini, Paola Caselli,
Francesco Giavazzi, Francesca Lotti, Marco Magnani, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Daniela Puggioni, Paolo Ses-
tito and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, at NBER conference and at \10 Years of the euro"
conference (Braga, May 7 & 8, 2009). The views expressed here are our own and do not necessarily re-
°ect those of the Bank of Italy. Correspondence: matteo.bugamelli@bancaditalia.it; fschivardi@unica.it;
roberta.zizza@bancaditalia.it.
2Competitive devaluations are in principle a possible option even in the post-euro era. Nevertheless, the
euro has put an end to the possibility of trade advantages with respect to the rest of the EA, which accounts
for a signi¯cant fraction of exports for all members. Further, as the euro is a stronger currency, the risk of
sharp devaluations is lower.
5these country-sectors.
We analyze restructuring along two dimensions. First, we consider whether there has
been a reallocation of factors away from the sectors that presumably had relied more heavily
on devaluations (between sectoral reallocation process). Second, we consider to what extent
the reallocation has occurred within sectors. As the recent body of literature on trade
and productivity has shown (Melitz 2003, Bernard, Jensen & Schott 2006a), most of the
productivity gains from trade opening are achieved via the reallocation of production from
less to more e±cient ¯rms within the same sector.
The between sectoral analysis is based on standard techniques of convergence/divergence
of productive structures. We ¯nd very weak support for the proposition that the euro has
induced a reallocation of activities between sectors. Speci¯cally, Krugman dissimilarity
indices show that intersectoral reallocation in the post-euro era has been almost nil for
most of the EA countries and modest for the rest. Although a ¯ner sectoral classi¯cation
might give a somewhat di®erent picture, we think it is plausible that a substantial process
of reallocation should be visible even using the 22 two-digit manufacturing sectors of the
NACE rev. 3 classi¯cation system.3
We then move on to consider whether there is evidence of within sectoral reallocation.
Ideally, one would like to test this hypothesis directly with ¯rm-level data. Unfortunately,
such data are not available at the cross-country level. Our analysis is therefore based on
sectoral data and on indirect measures of restructuring, in particular productivity growth.
We follow the approach introduced by Rajan & Zingales (1998). We rank countries by
how heavily they relied on devaluations, considering both nominal and real devaluation
vis-a-vis the DM over the 1980-98 period. We classify sectors according to how important
devaluations were for competitiveness using a series of indicators of the sectoral skill content,
with the idea that low skill content implies more price competition. An alternative ranking
is to look directly at the importance of emerging economies in world trade in each sector.
3The `end of competitive devaluation' is not the only channel through which the euro could have stimu-
lated factor reallocation. A 'trade integration' channel within the EA countries must be also acknowledged.
The bene¯ts from the use of a common currency - lower transaction costs, no exchange rate risk, better
price and cost transparency - are expected to enhance openness to trade and investment, as well as to foster
competition. Indeed, since the launch of the euro, bilateral trade among EA members has expanded far
more rapidly than trade with other EU countries (European Commission 2008, Baldwin 2006, de Nardis,
De Santis & Vicarelli 2008). Our results suggest that these channels too have had little impact on sectoral
reallocation.
6The variable we track is China's export share. The interaction between the country-level
devaluation measure and the sectoral skill content measure constitutes the indicator of how
much a country-sector should have been a®ected by the euro.
We ¯nd clear support for the hypothesis that the euro has induced relatively strong
intrasectoral restructuring. Productivity growth has been fastest in the sectors with low
skill content and the countries that had relied more on competitive devaluations. This result
is robust to a series of checks. In particular, to address potential omitted-variable bias we
not only include country and sector dummies but also a control group of countries that
are broadly similar to the EA countries except for adoption of the euro, namely Denmark,
Sweden and the UK. We also show that our results are not driven by some underlying
autocorrelated process, independent of the euro. Moreover, restructuring seems to have
had little negative e®ect on employment. The exception is when we rank sectors according
to the Chinese export share, in which case a clear negative e®ect on employment emerges.
Note that this is only a within country and sector comparison, so it does not allow to
draw conclusions on aggregate growth di®erentials between the countries or the sectors. All
we can say is that, relatively to the country and sector averages, the productivity growth
di®erential between low- and high-skill sectors was higher in a high devaluation country
than in a low devaluation one.
To obtain direct evidence on the restructuring process, we then turn to ¯rm-level evi-
dence from Italian manufacturing. We ¯rst review a series of 40 in-depth interviews with
entrepreneurs conducted by researchers of the Bank of Italy in 2007, in the spirit of the
NBER/Sloan \Pin factory" project (Borenstein, Farrell & Ja®e 1998). The interviews o®er
\soft" evidence on the restructuring process. They suggest that, since the adoption of the
euro, ¯rms have shifted their business focus from production to upstream and downstream
activities, such as R&D, product design, marketing and distribution. These activities, in
fact, can procure a certain degree of market power and enable ¯rms to escape the pure cost
competition. Moreover, the shift is more dramatic in traditional, low-tech activities, in line
with the aggregate evidence. Finally, it emerges that restructuring is an ongoing process,
not a single episode with a beginning and an end.
The insights from the interviews are corroborated by the \hard", quantitative evidence
7provided by a database of manufacturing ¯rms representative of the population of ¯rms
with at least 50 employees. First, the cross-sectional dispersion in both productivity and
pro¯tability has increased steadily since 1999, as one would expect during restructuring
episodes. And there is a marked decline in the share of blue-collar workers, consistent
with the thesis that ¯rms are shifting the focus away from production. The decline is
sharper, the lower the technological content of the sector. Interestingly, in the pre-euro era
the opposite was the case: low-tech ¯rms used devaluations to recoup price competitiveness
and intensi¯ed their reliance on low-skilled workers. We do not ¯nd that job °ows intensi¯ed
after the introduction of the euro; the restructuring process seems to entail a reallocation
of workers within rather than between ¯rms.
To close the circle, ¯nally we consider whether the restructuring ¯rms actually perform
better than the others, regressing value added and productivity growth on indicators of
restructuring at the ¯rm level derived from ad hoc questions on the importance of trade
marks and of changes in the mix of goods produced. We also include the share of blue-collar
workers. The results con¯rm that the ¯rms that undertook restructuring recorded higher
growth rates both in value added and in productivity.
A number of papers are considering the e®ects of the euro on member countries, ten
years after its inception. Alesina, Ardagna & Galasso (2009) show that the common cur-
rency has contributed to building political consensus for restructuring in the product mar-
kets, markedly through liberalization in the energy and communication sectors, but not in
the labor market. Bertola (2007) ¯nds an association between the euro adoption and the
improvements in terms of employment and equilibrium unemployment. Our work is more
broadly related to the growing body of literature that considers the e®ects of international
competition on national productive structure (Chen, Imbs & Scott 2007). The paper closest
to our sectoral analysis is Auer & Fischer (2008), on the e®ects on US industry of import
penetration from emerging economies. They also ¯nd that the US sectors most exposed to
competition from emerging countries recorded higher productivity growth, as well as lower
price in°ation. The same result on productivity is found by Bugamelli & Rosolia (2006) on
Italian data. Using US ¯rm-level data, Bernard et al. (2006a) ¯nd that industries' exposure
to imports from low-wage countries is correlated positively with the probability of plant
8death and negatively with employment growth. In a companion paper, Bernard, Jensen &
Schott (2006b) show that a reduction of inbound trade costs is positively associated with
industry productivity (TFP), the probability of plant death, the probability of entry of
new exporters, and export growth by incumbent exporters. For Italy, Bugamelli, Fabiani &
Sette (2008) show that greater exposure to Chinese export penetration has diminished the
pace of ¯rms' output price increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the data and
perform the between sector analysis. Section 3 explains the econometric approach to test
for within sector reallocation and discusses the results. Section 4 deals with the ¯rm-level
evidence for Italian manufacturing ¯rms and Section 5 concludes.
2 Cross-sectoral reallocation
In this section we analyze the productive structure of the European Union (EU) member
countries and its evolution over time; given the need for a su±ciently long period after the
introduction of the euro and data availability, we focus on the EU15 countries, i.e. the
11 that adopted the euro on its inception (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) plus Greece (entering the
EA in 2002) and Denmark, Sweden and the UK, which have not adopted the euro. Following
Bertola (2007), the three non-EA countries constitute the control group.4 Despite its evident
shortcomings, this is the best control group available.5 We assess whether the introduction
of the euro has induced a reallocation of production between sectors and, if so, whether
the intersectoral change has been more dramatic in the countries that had previously made
4Bertola (2007) uses a di®-in-di® approach to test the e®ects of the euro on income dispersion.
5Ideally, the control group should have more than three countries, to avoid that idiosyncratic country
patterns a®ect the results. However, what is really crucial is that the control group (non-EA members)
is comparable with the treatment group (EA members). As EU membership involves many factors not
available to the econometrician (laws, regulation, etc.), a control group with only EU countries should
provide the best guarantees in terms of similarity (Baldwin 2006), whereas including non-EU countries
seems more problematic. One could also object that the treatment is not fully exogenous, as in principle
the three non-euro members could have deliberately opted-out in order not to preclude future competitive
devaluations. This does not seem to be the case, however. For example, in the context of the assessment
made by HM Treasury on the case for the UK to join the eurozone, Buiter & Grafe (2003) conclude that
monetary independence has not been instrumental to maintain (or regain) competitiveness; indeed, \the
UK exchange rate during the 1990s and until well into 2002 has been a source of competitive misalignment"
(page 35).
9greater use of competitive devaluations. The main data source we rely upon in this and the
next section is the March 2008 release of the EU KLEMS database (Timmer, O'Mahony &
van Ark 2007). The manufacturing sector's share of value added in 2005 stood at around
20% for most countries, with lower values in France, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg.
Following the secular decline in manufacturing, the share decreased somewhat between
1998 and 2005 in most countries; Ireland and the UK experienced the most pronounced
downsizing of the sector.
From now on, we concentrate on manufacturing, as the e®ects we are considering work
through the terms of trade and so are important mostly for tradeable goods. Data on
value added, employment and capital stock for the manufacturing sector are available for
all EU15 countries with a breakdown into 22 industries corresponding as a rule to the two-
digit NACE classi¯cation. Southern countries, like Italy, Greece and Portugal, still have a
large share of their value added in traditional sectors like textiles, apparel, leather goods
and footwear. The other countries concentrate their production in more technologically
advanced sectors: machinery in Germany (but in Italy, too), chemicals in a host of countries
(Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK), radio, television and
communication equipment in the Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden in particular).
In order to facilitate the comparison of productive structures among countries and over
time, we ¯rst characterize sectors by their skill, R&D and ICT intensity and then group
them into intensity classes. Figures are computed from US data, which we use in the
regression analysis to avoid problems of endogeneity. Skill intensity is proxied by hours
worked by high-skilled persons, de¯ned as those with at least a college degree, as a share
in total hours; R&D intensity is R&D expenditure over value added; ICT intensity is the
ratio of ICT capital stock to the total capital stock, both in real terms.6
As Table 1 shows, the machinery and the electrical and optical equipment sectors ex-
hibit the highest ICT content; together with \other transport equipment", they spend a
relatively higher fraction of their value added on R&D and employ relatively more skilled
persons. As a rule, traditional sectors (producing food, textiles, leather and wood products)
are characterized by low values of the three indicators. Intensity classes (low, medium-low,
6ICT and skill intensity have been derived from EU KLEMS, R&D intensity comes from the OECD
STAN database.
10medium-high, high) are then de¯ned according to quartiles in the distribution of each in-
dicator (see Table A.1 in Appendix A for the matching of sectors into skill, ICT and R&D
categories). A glance at the value added shares broken down by skill content in 1998 and
2005 (Figure 1) suggests that sectoral modi¯cations were modest in the period. Only in
Finland and Sweden reallocation towards high-skill activities has been substantial; Ireland
stands out as the country where high-skill activities are prominent; if anything, Italy and
Spain have increased their share in low-intensity activities.
To address sectoral modi¯cation in a more synthetic way, we apply standard techniques
of convergence/divergence of productive structures. In particular, we calculate bilateral
dissimilarity indices based on value added shares broken down by industry and by skill,
R&D and ICT intensity according to the classi¯cation in Table A.1. Dissimilarity between










where a and b are the corresponding shares. The index ranges from 0 (perfect similarity) to
1 (perfect dissimilarity). The productive structure of each country is compared with that
of the EA, net of the country's own economy for EA members only; indices are calculated
for 1998 and 2005. Table 1 shows that, within the EA, the most highly dissimilar coun-
tries are, apart from Ireland and Luxembourg, which are exceptionally small, the southern
countries still specialized in low-skill activities. There is no sign of a uniform tendency
either towards convergence or divergence: some countries increased and others decreased
their similarity with the rest of the area. This is clear from Figure 2, where we take an
average of the indicators and plot the value for 2005 against that for 1998. Countries above
(below) the 45-degree line are those diverging from (converging to) the EA average sectoral
structure. In line with previous evidence of very limited sectoral modi¯cation for almost
all countries, we ¯nd little convergence/divergence; if anything, there is a slight tendency
toward heterogeneity.
We also evaluate, for each country, the dissimilarity index between 1998 and 2005 to
assess the extent of intersectoral change over the period. Irrespective of the sectoral break-
11down, the extent of sectoral reallocation proves to be fairly modest (Table 3). The dissimi-
larity index never goes beyond the ¯rst half of its range. The countries that changed their
structure most are Sweden and Finland, followed by Greece.
It is interesting to see whether the degree of intersectoral reallocation, though mild, is
related to competitive devaluations. We construct two measures of devaluation, nominal
and real (DEVNOM and DEVREAL, respectively), calculated as the cumulated di®erence
between January 1980 and December 1998 of the logarithm of each country's nominal/real
e®ective exchange rate as a deviation from that of Germany. In principle, a negative sign
indicates a depreciation relative to the DM; the absolute number refers to the intensity of
the cumulative depreciation or appreciation. But for ease of interpretation we invert the
signs, so that a higher value of the indicator re°ects more intensive resort to competitive
devaluations. Table 4 reports the values for DEVNOM and DEVREAL. The di®erence
between the two (¢P) is the cumulated change in relative producer prices. Both the
nominal and the real indicators have been computed with respect to 62 countries, including
the main emerging and developing economies. Both their exchange rates and their producer
prices have entered the indicator with a weight computed on the basis of trade °ows (see
Finicelli, Liccardi & Sbracia (2005) for the methodology).
We ¯nd that, when devaluation is measured in nominal terms (Figure 3), the countries
relying most heavily on devaluations are those most specialized in low-skill activities. This
positive relationship vanishes when we consider devaluation in real terms. We also ¯nd
some weak evidence that countries relying more heavily on devaluations exhibit relatively
more pronounced signs of intersectoral reallocation, as shown by Figure 4, where we plot the
dissimilarity index between 1998 and 2005 (reported in the ¯rst column of Table 3) against
real devaluation; this evidence does not depend on the choice of the indicator (nominal
versus real and di®erent sectoral breakdowns).
On the whole, we can conclude that the euro has not induced a structural break in
member countries' specialization patterns. Let us now move on to assess whether a process
of within sectoral restructuring characterized EA ¯rms in the ¯rst part of this decade, and in
particular whether this process was driven by the introduction of the euro, which eliminated
competitive devaluations.
123 Within sectoral reallocation
In this section we use sectoral data to test the hypothesis that the end of competitive
devaluations has induced a restructuring process in the EA ¯rms. We begin by describing
the empirical approach and the data, then move on to the results and ¯nally perform a
series of extensions and robustness checks.
3.1 The empirical approach and the data
We test the e®ects of the euro on within sectoral restructuring using sectoral data from
di®erent countries. Ideally, one would like to use direct measures of reallocation, such as
job creation and destruction, entry, exit, etc.. Unfortunately, such measures can only be
constructed from ¯rm-level data and so are not available for a cross section of countries.7
Accordingly, we use an outcome variable that should be closely related to reallocation, i.e.
productivity growth. In fact, if reallocation and restructuring bring about productivity
increases,8 then the country-sectors that restructured more should have recorded a higher
growth rate of productivity. We measure productivity as real value added per hour worked.
We also consider growth in employment (more precisely, number of hours worked) growth:
in fact, productivity increases might have been due simply to a reduction in the employment
level, connected with the exit of the less productive plants and workers, the reorganization
of production and o®shoring. Descriptive statistics by country for the outcome variables
are provided in Table A.2 in Appendix A.
We follow the approach introduced by Rajan & Zingales (1998) in their paper on the
e®ects of ¯nancial development on growth. The idea is to exploit both cross-country and
cross-sectoral variability to test the e®ects of the euro on productivity growth. First, we
determine how heavily the various countries had relied on devaluations (DEVi): we expect
that the greater this reliance, the stronger the e®ects of the euro. Second, we propose
a measure Sj of how important devaluations were for sectoral competitiveness before the
euro: in some sectors competition is mainly price competition, so movements in the terms
7See Davis, Haltiwanger & Schu (1996) for an overview of a large body of literature developed in the
nineties regarding sectoral reallocation. Bartelsmann, Scarpetta & Schivardi (2005) compute sectoral statis-
tics of reallocation for 9 OECD countries, but their time span stops at the end of the nineties at best.
8The literature on productivity growth decomposition has identi¯ed various sources of productivity in-
creases related to reallocation and restructuring; see Foster, Haltiwanger & Krizan (2001) for a survey.
13of trade are a fundamental determinant of performance; for others, product di®erentiation
may be more pronounced, so that prices could be just one in a series of other factors in
competitiveness, such as product quality, brand name and technological content. If the
euro has had any e®ect in terms of restructuring, we expect it to be strongest in the
country-sectors that relied more intensively on competitive devaluations, as measured by
the interaction between the country and the sectoral indicators, DEVi ¤ Sj. We can test
our argument through the following regression:
¢lnyij9805 = ®0 + ®1DEVi ¤ Sj + ®0
2Xij + DCi + DSj + uij (2)
where ¢lnyij9805 is average yearly productivity growth in country i and sector j between
1998 and 2005, Xij are additional controls and DCi and DSj are country and sector dummies
respectively. Our prediction concerns the coe±cient ®1: if ®1 > 0, the higher the country-
sector reliance on devaluations, the stronger the e®ects of the euro on productivity: ®1 =
@2¢lnyij=@DEVi@Sj.
One important feature of this approach is the inclusion of both country and sector
dummies. Country dummies ensure that the results are not driven by speci¯c country
characteristics that might potentially be related to the devaluation measure: rather, we use
within country di®erences in sectoral growth rates to identify the parameters of interest.
The same applies to sectors: we do not compare di®erent growth rates of productivity
across sectors, as these might be dictated by sectoral characteristics potentially related
to the variables we use to classify them. As such, this approach is robust to the main
criticisms of the cross-country regressions with aggregate data, such as omitted-variable
bias and reverse causality.9
Although the inclusion of country and sector dummies controls for the most likely omit-
ted variable problems, one could still argue that we might just be capturing an underlying
process that would have occurred even without the euro. For example, the intensifying
competition from emerging countries might have forced restructuring regardless. Such a
9Reverse causality could occur if productivity growth were persistent and low-productivity-growth sectors
were determining the devaluation pattern before the euro. In this case, the correlation would actually be
because productivity growth causes DEV. However, if anything, this should bias our estimates downward,
inducing a negative correlation between DEV and productivity growth.
14process might have been more pronounced precisely in those countries and sectors that
relied more on competitive devaluations, potentially more vulnerable to such competition.
This is indeed a very serious concern. To address it, we take the three countries that did
not adopt the euro as a control group and compute the e®ect of the interaction for the EA
in deviation from non-EA countries. Formally, our regression framework is represented by:
¢lnyij9805 = ¯0 + ¯1DEVi ¤ Sj + ¯2EAi ¤ DEVi ¤ Sj+
+ ¯0
3Xij + DCi + DSj + uij (3)
where EAi is a dummy equal to 1 for the EA countries. In this speci¯cation, the coe±cient
¯2 measures the deviation of the EA e®ect from that of the non EA countries, ¯1. The idea
is that the latter countries did not give up the possibility of devaluing, but are similar to
the EA countries from an economic point of view, because as members of the EU they are
subject to identical foreign trade rules, with the exception of the exchange rate. Di®erences
in the degree of restructuring according to the interaction term can therefore be attributed
to the euro. As discussed above (see footnote 5), this control group is probably the best
available, although it can be criticized both for its small size and its not necessarily random
selection. To make sure that our results are not totally dependent on the control group, we
also estimate equation (2) on EA members only, that is considering the absolute e®ect rather
than the deviation from the control group. In this case, we are not controlling for potential
confounding factors. However, we still control for ¯xed country and sectoral attributes, so
that these estimates allow us to assess the extent to which our results depend on the control
group.
In terms of the country-level indicator, we want to capture the reliance on competitive
devaluations. From the theoretical standpoint, it is unclear whether real or nominal deval-
uation is the relevant variable. Consider a country that kept a ¯xed nominal exchange rate
with the DM but gained competitiveness by curbing price rises. For it, the euro should not
represent much of a change, as the exchange rate was already stable, and using real deval-
uation might overstate its reliance on devaluations. On the other side, consider a country
with relatively rapid price in°ation, that used devaluations to limit the e®ects on competi-
tiveness. For such a country, appreciation was already under way before the euro, and using
15the nominal exchange rate would overstate the reliance on devaluations. These examples
suggest that the ideal indicator should consider real devaluations that were due to changes
in the nominal exchange rate. To capture this, in our basic speci¯cation we introduce both
the nominal exchange rate and the degree of relative producer price in°ation, to allow for
potentially di®erent dynamics of the two components of the real exchange rate. We test
whether the coe±cients of the two variables are opposite in sign and equal in absolute value,
in which case the real exchange rate can be used directly.
For the sectoral indicators, we assume that price competition is more relevant in activi-
ties with a low human capital content, i.e. in which low-skilled workers are prevalent. The
products of low-skill activities are likely to compete more in price than quality, relative to
high-skill products. For a sector with low human capital content, the end of devaluations
should have represented a stronger incentive to restructure; other things being equal, these
sectors should have recorded higher productivity increases. Our main indicator is thus the
skill content at the sectoral level. Following Rajan & Zingales (1998), to avoid endogeneity
problems we use the US measure, on the assumption that skill content is largely a technolog-
ical characteristic, so that the measure computed for the US also applies to other countries.
This assumption is particularly suitable for the EA countries, whose level of development
is comparable to the US. In accordance with our interpretation, we use sectoral low-skill
intensity, that is (1-skill intensity). This makes it easier to read the regression results.
We also experiment with other measures of sectoral dependence on devaluation. Follow-
ing the same reasoning as above, high-R&D activities should also compete less on price and
more on quality and technological content, reducing the price sensitivity of demand and
hence the e®ects of exchange rate movements. Low-R&D activities should be characterized
by greater price elasticity of demand, intensifying the response to terms of trade movements.
We also use ICT intensity, on the assumption that this is related to technological content.
As before, we de¯ne sectors in terms of low R&D and ICT intensity: (1-R&D content) and
(1-ICT intensity), again computed for US sectors.
Underlying our approach is the idea that in low-human-capital activities, the end to
competitive devaluations has deprived EA countries of an instrument for meeting the com-
petition from low-wage emerging economies. An alternative way to rank sectors, then, is
16to look directly at the importance of those economies in world trade. We take the most
important of them, China, and compute its share of world exports in 1998. In this case, we
are testing whether restructuring has been more intensive in countries that had relied on
devaluations more heavily and in sectors where China's export share was larger.
The bottom part of Table 1 reports the correlation coe±cients between the sectoral
indicators. As expected, the correlation between the ¯rst three indicators is high, ranging
from 0.6 to 0.8. That between the China's world market share and the others is negative.
That is, the Chinese share is inversely related to the human capital content of production,
but correlation is low in absolute terms: -0.3 with ICT and skill intensity and -0.1 with
R&D intensity, suggesting that to see China simply as a low-human-capital good exporter
might be to miss some important features of its economy.
We also run the same regression for EA countries in the period before the introduction
of the euro. The assumption is that at that time the competitive pressures were mitigated
by competitive devaluations. In this case, we expect no particular di®erence between the
study and the control group. In the language of the policy evaluation literature, we make
sure that we are not simply capturing pre-existing trends, and that the euro did indeed
induce a structural break.
3.2 Results
Our main regression is based on equation (3), where the outcome is average annual produc-
tivity growth for the period 1998-2005. In addition to sectoral and country dummies, we
include the log of the initial value of the dependent variable and, to control for any country-
sector trend, its growth rate in the period 1995-98. Moreover, unless otherwise stated, to
avoid endogeneity problems we weight observations according to sectoral employment in
1998. We run weighted regressions for two reasons. First, accounting for the importance
of the sector gives an estimated coe±cient representative of the population e®ect. Second,
sectoral data could su®er from measurement error, which is likely to be negatively correlated
with the size of the sector itself. In particular, mismeasurement of employment or value
added in some small sectors might have a powerful impact on the estimates.10 Finally, all
10For example, in 1998 the `O±ce, accounting and computing machinery' sector only had 1,500 employees
in Austria, 800 in Belgium and 300 in Greece; the `Leather, leather products and footwear' sector only 1,300
17standard errors are computed using the White robust correction.
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (3) when the sectoral dependence on
devaluations is gauged by low-skill intensity. Panel A shows the estimates for productivity
growth. The ¯rst column includes the interaction of skill intensity both with nominal
devaluation (DEVNOM) and with relative producer price in°ation (¢P). The estimates
for the control group are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, in line with the idea that
for these countries the euro has not brought a structural break. Relative to the control
group, the EA countries that had devalued more before the euro show relatively sharper
productivity growth in low-skill-intensive sectors, while the reverse holds for the interaction
with producer price in°ation. The two coe±cients are opposite in sign and very similar in
absolute value (1.17 vs. -1.05) and we fail to reject the hypothesis that one is equal to the
negative of the other. We interpret this as an indication that, while our earlier questions
concerning the best measure of devaluation may be important in principle, in practice real
devaluation is a su±cient statistic for our purposes. We therefore concentrate on it in the
other columns.
In column 2 we give the basic speci¯cation, with the interaction term constructed with
the real exchange rate (DEVREAL). For the three non-EA countries we ¯nd a negative
coe±cient, signi¯cant at 10%. This implies that productivity in sectors with less skill
intensity grew relatively less the greater the real devaluation vis-a-vis the DM in the 1980-98
period. The interaction with the EA dummy gives a positive coe±cient (1.01), signi¯cant at
5% (standard error equal to 0.40): compared to the control group, among the EA countries
productivity growth has been stronger, the greater real devaluation in the 1980-98 period
and the lower the sectoral skill intensity. The other controls have the expected sign; in
particular, productivity growth is positively serially correlated and displays mean reversion.
To evaluate the magnitude of the e®ects, we use the growth di®erential, de¯ned as:
GD ´ ¯2 ¤ (DEV75 ¡ DEV25) ¤ (S75 ¡ S25)
where DEV75 is the value of DEV for the country at the 75th percentile of the distribution
(Spain) and DEV25 at the 25th percentile (France), S75 is the sector at the 75th percentile
in Ireland.
18of the skill distribution (other non metallic mineral products) and S25 at the 25th percentile
(other transport equipment). GD measures how much more productivity grew in a low-skill
sector (namely, at the 75th percentile of the skill distribution) compared to a high-skill
one (at the 25th percentile) in a country that relied heavily on devaluations (at the 75th
percentile) compared to one that did not (at the 25th percentile). For ¯2 = 1:01, the growth
di®erential is 1.7%, a sizeable e®ect, equal to the median yearly productivity growth and
just below the mean (2.1%). It is important to note that this is only a within country and
sector comparison, so it does not allow to draw conclusions on growth di®erential between
the countries or the sectors. For example, it might well be that average productivity growth
in Spain has been lower than in France: this would be captured by the country dummy.
Similarly, average productivity growth in low-skill intensity sectors might have been lower
than in high intensity ones. All we can say is that, relatively to the country and sector
averages, the productivity growth di®erential between low- and high-skill sectors was higher
in Spain than in France.
We then perform a series of robustness checks of this basic result. In column 3 we repeat
the exercise without weights. The estimate of the coe±cient drops to 0.7 and the standard
error increases slightly, so that the p-value is equal to 0.16. This indicates that the weighting
scheme is important to obtain a signi¯cant coe±cient, suggesting that the results have to
be taken with due caution. Still, the value is positive and the p-stat reasonably low.
One could argue that ¯rms require some time to adjust to the change of regime brought
about by the euro. Moreover, even if restructuring started early on, such processes might
take some time to result in productivity gains. According to this interpretation, one should
¯nd that the e®ects of restructuring are more visible in the latter part of the post-euro
period, so we repeat the exercise calculating productivity growth for the 2002-05 period.11
The coe±cient does increase substantially, to 1.5, and is signi¯cant at 1%, lending support
to the view that the e®ects of the euro on European ¯rms did take some time to become
appreciable. In fact, if we run the exercise for the 1998-2002 period (unreported), we get a
substantially lower coe±cient (0.36) not signi¯cantly di®erent from 0 (standard error equal
11To maximize comparability with the other regressions, we use the same initial value and pre-euro growth
rate as for the other columns. Results are unchanged if we use the log of productivity in 2002 and the growth
rate in the 1998-2002 period.
19to 0.26).
As argued above, a possible criticism relates to the control group, only made up of
three countries. In column 5 we run regression (2) only for the EA countries. In this case,
we are not controlling for potential confounding factors; still, given that both sector and
country dummies are included, we are controlling for ¯xed attributes on both levels. We
¯nd a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient, although smaller, in accordance with the fact
that the e®ect was negative for the control group. According to this estimate, the growth
di®erential is 0.96%. This allows us to exclude the possibility that our results are simply
driven by some idiosyncratic characteristics of the control group: within the EA countries,
productivity grew faster exactly in those country-sectors that are most likely to be hit by
the introduction of the ¯xed exchange rate regime.
As observed earlier, one might expect that productivity growth has been achieved
through downsizing and o®shoring, in which case it should go hand in hand with a re-
duction in employment. In Panel B we repeat the exercise using employment growth as
the dependent variable. Contrary to this proposition, we ¯nd no clear relation between our
interaction measure and employment growth. The coe±cient of the interaction is generally
negative, but is small in absolute value and not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. According
to this ¯nding, restructuring does not seem to have had a downside in terms of job losses.
These basic patterns are con¯rmed when using R&D and ICT intensity as sectoral
indicators of the importance of devaluations.12 In Table 6 we report the results for the
R&D indicator. As before, the coe±cient of the interaction is positive and signi¯cant,
again with the exception of the unweighed regression. The e®ect increases in the second
sub-period and still holds when computed on the EA countries only. The growth di®erential
implied by the estimate in column 1 is similar in magnitude to that using skill intensity
(1.6% productivity growth increase per year). Again, no clear e®ect on employment emerge,
if anything, there is some evidence of a positive impact.
Similar results hold for ICT intensity, although the estimates tend to be less precise.
The growth di®erential is 1.2% per year (Table 7). With this indicator, we get a signi¯cant
coe±cient also in the unweighed case, while no evidence of a stronger e®ect in the second
12As for skill intensity, the speci¯cation with DEVNOM and ¢P con¯rms that DEVREAL is a su±cient
statistic for our purposes. According, that speci¯cation is not reported.
20sub-period emerges. The employment regressions again suggest no e®ect of the interaction
term.
Findings are somewhat di®erent when the sectoral indicator is the export share of China
(Table 8). In this case, the productivity estimates tend to be less clear-cut. First, they are
only signi¯cant for the baseline speci¯cation and for the unweighed one. The e®ect disap-
pears when we exclude the control group, suggesting that these results are to be treated
with even more caution than the others. In any case, according to the baseline speci¯-
cation, the growth di®erential is 0.5% where the sectors at the 25th and 75th percentiles
are, respectively, chemicals and chemical products and rubber and plastic products. More
interestingly, a negative e®ect on employment emerges. In the basic speci¯cation we get a
coe±cient of -1.77, signi¯cant at 5%. The implied growth di®erential is -0.6%.
As a ¯nal check, we run the same regressions as above for the period over which we
computed the devaluation indicators, 1980-98. This is to make sure that we are not just
capturing some underlying autocorrelated process that was already operating before the
euro.13 To save on space, we report only the main speci¯cation, with DEVREAL. There is
no support for this hypothesis (Table 9). Neither the e®ect for the control group nor the
deviation for the EA countries is signi¯cant for productivity or for employment for any of
the sectoral indicators. This further substantiates the argument that our results really are
capturing a speci¯c e®ect of the euro, not some other concomitant factor.
All in all, these regressions suggest that the end of competitive devaluations has had a
positive impact on productivity growth in those countries and sectors that had presumably
relied more on them. Moreover, there does not appear to be any downside in terms of jobs:
reallocation does not seem to have come at the expenses of employment growth. A clear
exception to this is the regression using the Chinese export share. This analysis begs the
question of how productivity growth was achieved, i.e. how restructuring occurred. We
tackle this issue in the next section.
13The inclusion of lagged growth in the regressions should already account for this.
214 Firm-level evidence of restructuring: the case of Italian
manufacturing
In this section we turn to ¯rm-level evidence on the response to the euro, drawn mostly from
a survey of Italian manufacturing ¯rms run by the Bank of Italy (INVIND). Restricting at-
tention to Italy clearly limits the generality of the results, but Italy is an interesting case, as
it had relied heavily on competitive devaluations and is specialized in traditional, low-tech
activities, which according to the evidence set out above should have been most severely
a®ected by the introduction of the common currency. We ¯rst review some insights from a
series of case studies, then consider the time-series evolution of various measures of reallo-
cation activities and, ¯nally, study the correlation between restructuring and performance
at the level of the ¯rm.
4.1 Case studies
In the spring of 2007, the Bank of Italy conducted in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs
and CEOs of some 40 Italian ¯rms, mostly in the manufacturing sector. Like the NBER/Sloan
\Pin factory" project (Borenstein et al. 1998), the survey involved long interviews (between
2 and 4 hours). The interviewers, always researchers of the Bank of Italy, followed a set
schema, but most of the interview was left for the entrepreneurs to elaborate freely. The
main goal was to assess whether the ¯rms were restructuring and in what forms. Of course,
40 interviews cannot be statistically representative. The aim was to understand what forces
were driving the process and how ¯rms were responding, in order among other things to
guide subsequent quantitative analysis. The main ¯ndings were summarized in an internal
report by Omiccioli & Schivardi (2007), on which this section is based; the report has not
yet been made public for con¯dentiality reasons.
One clear insight from the interviews is that success stories are invariably based on some
degree of market power. Entrepreneurs are generally very clear that, given the growing role
of low-wage countries in the world trade, competition based on production costs is rapidly
becoming unsustainable, so the production of homogeneous, undi®erentiated goods is less
and less viable. All the ¯rms that were surviving or even prospering in the globalized
22economy o®ered products that had a certain degree of di®erentiation and thus escaped pure
cost competition. The challenge is to build up and maintain such market power.
The experiences reviewed were highly di®erentiated in a number of dimensions; by
product, ¯rm size, and the entrepreneur's personal history. But all the cases of successful
restructuring had one feature in common: the ¯rms had invested in activities not directly
involving production. These activities may be classed as:
² Upstream: product creation (R&D, design) and brand establishment (advertising,
marketing).
² Auxiliary: organization of production, often partly or wholly outside the ¯rm (through
outsourcing and o®shoring); generally based on intensive use of ICT.
² Downstream: sales network, post-sales assistance.
These activities are not important only for high-tech products. Rather, the importance of
each component varies with the particular business considered. For ¯nal goods producers,
the crucial needs are the establishment of a brand, the organization of production and the
creation of a sales network. For high-tech activities, the creation of the product, partic-
ularly through R&D, remains the main route to competitive advantage. For producers of
intermediate goods, customers require constant assistance, particularly for ¯rms producing
industrial machineries.
We interviewed some ¯rms operating in the traditional sectors of clothing and shoes.
The success stories entailed a shift of the business focus away from production towards
brand creation and product design, maintaining a coordinating role in production, which
was mostly outsourced, often abroad.14 Out of 800 workers of a ¯rm producing machines
for tile making, only 70 were employed in the plant, the rest divided between product
design (200) and marketing and administration. The prototypes of successful ¯rms suggest
that competitive strength is built outside the factory, by workers not directly involved
in the production process. We will use this insight in our subsequent empirical analysis:
14An entrepreneur in the shoe sector de¯ned his ¯rm as \a services ¯rm that collects information from
the market, elaborates it, designs products and dictates instructions to the other ¯rms on how to produce
them." Until 1999 this ¯rm, which now employs 260 workers and produces only the models internally, was
a traditional shoe-maker that produced for other brands.
23restructuring means a greater reliance on non-production workers and, consequently, entails
a reduction of the share of blue-collar workers in the workforce.
In terms of cross-sectoral di®erences, the process seems to be most intensive for low-tech
activities. Most of the high-tech ¯rms did not perceive either the euro or the globalization as
a discontinuity in the competitive landscape. For them, in fact, competition focuses mostly
on innovation and R&D. For example, an entrepreneur producing electrical machinery said
that his ¯rm had a 3-year lead over its Chinese competitors in technology and contended
that was the key competitive edge to be maintained, rather than lowering production costs.
Another ¯rm in the medical and precision instrument ¯eld saw its main competitors as lo-
cated in Germany and Japan; the strong euro had created the opportunity for an important
acquisition in the US.
For low-tech ¯rms, particularly those operating in the traditional sectors such as clothing
and leather, the change was much more profound. All the entrepreneurs in these sectors
stressed that a dramatic change in the competitive environment had occurred with the
introduction of the euro. Some had changed their business model radically (see footnote
14); those who had not were clearly struggling. This anecdotic evidence squares with the
results of the previous section: the euro was a greater shock for activities of low skill content.
It also suggests that the lower the technological content of the activity, the sharper the shift
away from production is likely to be.
Further, the entrepreneurs do not think that the restructuring process is over. They
all believed that the international landscape will keep changing fast in the coming years.
Also, changes in the business model depend crucially on the individual histories of the
¯rms. In particular, for family ¯rms (almost all those interviewed could be classi¯ed as
such) radical change tends to coincide with generational succession. Finally, restructuring
itself is an ongoing, sequential activity, not a zero/one event. For example, many ¯rms
had been introducing business software, particularly some form of Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP), but this was mostly done in steps, ¯rst digitalizing accounting, then BtoB
transactions, then production and so on. In fact, we interviewed ¯rms with very di®erent
degrees of penetration of business software. All in all, therefore, we expect restructuring to
be a smooth, ongoing process rather than concentrated in a short period of time.
244.2 Quantitative evidence from manufacturing ¯rms15
The increasing availability of data-sets with ¯rm-level information has spurred a vast lit-
erature on restructuring (Davis et al. 1996). The basic idea, following the seminal work
of Lilien (1982), is that periods of restructuring are characterized by intense factor real-
location and increased dispersion of ¯rms' performance. In fact, when a shock hits the
economy, some ¯rms adapt and some do not, so that their performance diverges and factors
are reallocated to successful restructurers. In this section we use the insights from this
literature and the case studies reviewed above to assess the degree of restructuring of the
Italian manufacturing sector following the introduction of the euro.
The data come from the Bank of Italy's annual survey of manufacturing ¯rms (INVIND).
INVIND is an open panel of around 1,200 ¯rms per year representative of manufacturing
¯rms with at least 50 employees. It contains detailed information on ¯rms' characteristics,
including industrial sector, nationality, year of creation, number of employees, value of
shipments, value of exports and investment. The questionnaire contains a ¯xed part and
a rotating part used to investigate topics of special interest in the year. The resulting
database has been used extensively (for a description of the database see, among others,
Fabiani, Schivardi & Trento 2005, Guiso & Parigi 1999, Iranzo, Schivardi & Tosetti 2008).
If not all ¯rms are equally successful at restructuring, performance should become more
highly dispersed. Following up on the aggregate analysis, we consider productivity, mea-
sured as log of sales per worker,16 and check whether its dispersion increased after the
introduction of the euro. Figure 5 shows that in fact it did: the cross-¯rm dispersion of
sales per worker goes from around 0.64 in the ¯rst part of the nineties to around 0.70 in
the euro period.17 Moreover, the dispersion increases almost monotonically up to the last
available year (2007), suggesting that the process is still very much under way: in fact, if the
restructuring wave were over, we would expect dispersion to revert to \business as usual"
levels. We have also computed the dispersion of gross operating pro¯ts (EBITDA, earnings
15This subsection draws on the M.A. dissertation of Daniela Puggioni (2008) at the University of Cagliari.
16Usually productivity is measured as value added per worker, but this is not available for a su±ciently
long time span. However, given that part of the restructuring activity might entail the o®shoring of some
part of the production process, sales per worker might capture such reorganization of the production chain
better.
17To make sure that results are not driven by outliers, we have also computed various interquartile ranges,
¯nding exactly the same pattern.
25before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) over value added, drawn from the
Cerved data-set.18 In fact, Foster, Haltiwanger & Syverson (2008) show that selection and
reallocation are due more to di®erences in pro¯tability than in productivity. In Figure 5
we therefore also plot the standard deviation of pro¯ts, ¯nding that they follow a similar
pattern to productivity.
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where E¡ is the set of ¯rms that reduce employment; net employment growth is EGt =
JCt ¡ JDt; job reallocation is the sum of job creation and destruction, JRt = JCt + JDt.
Finally we also construct a measure of excess job reallocation, ERt = JRt ¡ jEGtj which
measures the job reallocation in excess of that required to reach a given change in net
employment; for example, a sector might be constantly expanding employment and at the
same time reallocating production among existing units: ER measures the job °ow rate net
of that due to sectoral employment expansion.
In Figure 6 we report JC, JD and EG. Job destruction peaks in 1993, when employment
in the sample contracted by more than 5%. After that, both JC and JD remain fairly
stable at values between 2% and 4%. Consistent with the downward trend in manufacturing
employment, EG is negative in most years. Job reallocation also peaks in 1993, then reverts
to a fairly stable level of around 6%. ER shows a modest upward trend since 1998, with
a peak in 2000 but again with fairly modest variations. Thus the traditional measures of
18INVIND does not allow computation of pro¯tability measures. We have therefore used Cerved, a
database with balance-sheet information for almost all Italian limited liability companies, available since
1996. Cerved has no information on employment and therefore cannot be used for the other analysis in this
section.
19See Davis et al. (1996) for a detailed explanation of job °ow measures.
20The normalization by
1
2(Et + Et¡1) rather than Et¡1 constraints JC between -2 and 2 rather than -1
and 1. The distribution is symmetric around 0 and easier to interpret graphically.
26restructuring o®er little support to the hypothesis of an increase in restructuring after the
euro. All the indicators of job reallocation (with the exception of ER) peak in the recession
of the early nineties and then level o®. This occurs at the same time as the increase in
productivity and pro¯tability dispersion which suggests two things. First, the reallocation
process induced by the euro has a smooth, ongoing character, especially when compared to
that related to the deep recession of 1993; in particular, it seems to have little e®ect on the
reallocation of factors across ¯rms, possibly because of the degree of °exibility of the factor
markets. Second, and strictly related, the post-euro restructuring might be of a di®erent
type from that of the early nineties and require di®erent indicators: in particular, rather
than showing up in job °ows across ¯rms, it might have induced more within ¯rm changes
in workforce composition.21
The case studies suggest that the ¯rms that did well tended to shift from production
to upstream and downstream activities, such as R&D, design, marketing and distribution
chains. In terms of workforce composition, this implies that we should see a decrease in
the share of blue-collar workers. Their average share decreased from 0.69 in 1990 to 0.62 in
2007 (Figure 7). This pattern re°ects a secular trend, common to all developed economies,
but with a clear break around the 1992 devaluation: from 1992 to 1998, the share stays
roughly constant at around 0.67. It starts declining rapidly in 1999, falling to 0.62 in
2007. This evidence is consistent with the thesis that the devaluation of 1992 allowed ¯rms
to gain cost competitiveness, boosting the relative importance of production. With the
euro, this possibility is ruled out and ¯rms had to adapt their strategy, shifting away from
production and therefore reducing the share of blue-collar workers. This interpretation is
further corroborated by the analysis of the cross-¯rm variance in the share of blue-collar.
Up to 1998 there is no clear trend in the cross sectional dispersion of this share.22 Consistent
with the hypothesis that the euro has forced a shift away from low-skill activities, and that
the process has not been uniform across ¯rms, starting in 1999 the standard deviation of
the share of blue-collar workers increases steadily, from around 0.18 to 0.21.
21Unfortunately, due to the lack of information on entry and exit, we can not compute the decomposition
of productivity growth into the within ¯rm, between ¯rm and net entry components.
22This graphical evidence is supported by the more formal analysis of Iranzo et al. (2008), who study
the within and between ¯rm skill dispersion using the same sample for the period 1980-97, ¯nding a very
stable time series pattern for the cross-¯rm component of skill dispersion, i.e. no evidence of an increase in
dispersion.
27According to the insights of the cross-country analysis of the previous section, the shift
away from low-skill workers should have been stronger in low-tech activities, which had
relied more on competitive devaluations. To check whether this is indeed the case, we have
grouped ¯rms according to the OECD classi¯cation system (OECD 2003), dividing them
into 4 classes: low, medium-low, medium-high and high tech. Figure 8 reports the time
series for the share of blue-collar workers for the 4 groups of ¯rms. In general, the paths
are similar to the aggregate, with a pause in the decrease after the 1992 devaluation and an
acceleration starting in 1999. A clear exception is the group of high-tech ¯rms, for which
no clear pattern emerges, while the decrease is sharpest among the low-tech ¯rms, which
reduced the share of blue-collar workers by around 8 percentage points between 1999 and
2007. A similar picture emerges when considering the cross-¯rm dispersion in the share of
blue-collar workers: again the largest increases are recorded by low and medium-low tech
¯rms.
To corroborate the graphical analysis, we have run some di®-in-di® regressions of the
following form:
ShBlueft = ®0 + ®1 ¤ LOWf ¤ POSTt + ®2LOWf + ®3Xft + YEARt + "ft; (4)
where ShBlueft is the share of blue-collar workers in ¯rm f at time t, LOW is a dummy
equal to 1 if the ¯rm belongs to the low-tech group, POST is a dummy equal to 1 for the
years 1999-2007, YEAR is a full set of year dummies and Xft includes ¯rm size (log of
total employment) and 4 regional dummies (north-west, north-east, center and south). The
LOW dummy controls for ¯xed group attributes, in particular for the fact that low-tech
¯rms have a higher share of blue-collar workers than other ¯rms; the year dummies control
for possible time trends. The coe±cient ®1 therefore measures the change in the share of
blue-collar workers for the ¯rms in the LOW group before and after the euro, as a deviation
from the change for ¯rms in the control group (¯rms not in the LOW group). As such, it
can be interpreted as the extra e®ect of the euro on the LOW ¯rms, compared to the control
group. The results reported in Table 10 clearly con¯rm the graphical analysis. The ¯rst
column applies only the dummy for the low-tech ¯rms; the control group therefore comprises
all other ¯rms. The coe±cient indicates the decrease in the share of blue-collar workers
28has been 3 percentage points greater among low-tech ¯rms than among other since 1999,
with a strong statistical signi¯cance. In the second column we also include a MEDIUM-
LOW*POST dummy, so that now the control group consists of medium-high and high-tech
¯rms. Again, we ¯nd that low and medium-low-tech ¯rms decreased the share of blue-collar
workers more substantially; and the same occurs when we include a dummy for medium-
high-tech ¯rms as well (column 3). The intensity of the decrease is inversely related to the
technological content. Consistent with the ¯ndings of the previous section, the e®ect of the
euro on workforce composition decreases monotonically with technological intensity. These
results are very robust to changes in the speci¯cation. We have also included additional ¯rm
controls, such as indicators of productivity, export propensity and sales (as an alternative
measure of size), ¯nding no signi¯cant di®erences in the results.
One important objection to this exercise is that we might be capturing di®erences in
trends in the occupational mix. That is, it might simply be that low-tech ¯rms were already
reducing blue-collar workers more intensively before the euro launch. For a limited number
of ¯rms, we can reconstruct the technological classi¯cation since 1984. To check whether
we are picking up di®erences in trends, we have re-run regression (4) for the period 1984-
90, with the POST dummy equal to 1 for 1988-90 and 0 before (this splits the sample
approximately equally). If we are simply capturing di®erences in underlying trends, we
should then ¯nd that ®1 is negative also in the eighties, when competitive devaluations
were still possible. But columns (4-6) of Table 10 show that, if anything, in the eighties
low-tech ¯rms were actually increasing the blue-collar intensity of the workforce compared
to the high-tech ones. These ¯ndings are robust to changes in the year of de¯nition of the
post-period and to including years up to 1998. We can conclude that before the euro low-
tech ¯rms used devaluations to regain price competitiveness and intensi¯ed their reliance on
low-skilled workers; on the contrary, high-tech ¯rms competed mostly in other dimensions
and so were increasing the relative skill content of their workforce.
4.3 Restructuring and ¯rm performance
Was restructuring e®ective in terms of ¯rms performance? We measure performance in
terms of growth of value added and productivity and rely on a simple cross-sectional em-
29pirical speci¯cation of the following form:
gi;t0t = ¯0 + ¯1 ¤ RESi;t0 + ¯2Xi;t0 + YEARt0 + "i; (5)
where gi;t0t is the ¯rms average growth rate of real value added or productivity (value added
per employee) in the period t0t and t0 is the ¯rst available year for a ¯rm in the sample,
starting in 2000. To maximize the number of ¯rms, we do not limit the sample to those that
are surveyed both in 2000 and 2005, but also include ¯rms sampled for at least a pair of
consecutive years during the period. To net out cyclical e®ects, we compute the growth rate
as the residual of a preliminary regression of the raw growth rate data on year dummies and
the initial value of value added or productivity. The starting year is 2000 instead of 1999
because some of our proxies for restructuring take 2000 as the reference year (the results
do not change using 1999). YEARt0 is a set of dummies for the ¯rst year in which a ¯rm is
in the data-set; Xit0 includes ¯rm size (log of total employment), sectoral dummies at two
digits of the NACE rev. 1 classi¯cation and the usual 4 regional dummies, all computed
at t0. We focus on the coe±cient of RES, a measure of restructuring activity, for which
we use di®erent proxies. The ¯rst comes directly from the previous analysis and refers to
the share of blue-collar workers: here we check both the initial level of the share (ShBlue)
and its average annual change in 2000-06 (¢ShBlue). If the reduced reliance on low-skilled
workers has indeed been one of the dominant strategies to regain competitiveness after the
introduction of the euro, we should ¯nd a negative relationship between this variable and
¯rm performance. There is a clear negative e®ect of the initial share of blue-collar workers
on value added and productivity growth (Table 11, columns 2 and 5), while the coe±cient of
the contemporaneous change in that share is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (columns
1 and 4). The former result con¯rms the idea that if we control for sectoral di®erences in
technology ¯rms that focused more on non-production activities, through a larger share of
white-collar workers, have performed better. Given the likely smooth and ongoing nature
of the restructuring process, it is not surprising that our contemporaneous indicator is not
able to fully capture the impact of restructuring on performance.
We then search for a heterogeneous e®ect of restructuring across sectors. As pointed out
in the previous section, we might expect that, controlling for average sectoral di®erences
30in the blue-collar share, ¯rm heterogeneity in performance is more strongly linked to the
share in low-tech sectors. The data do not support this thesis, possibly because of lack of
su±cient statistical power (the coe±cient is negative but statistically insigni¯cant).
We check whether the e®ect of the blue-collar share on performance is indeed related to
the euro by running similar regressions for the period 1990-95, when Italian ¯rms could rely
on devaluation to gain international competitiveness. Over this period we would expect no
role for restructuring and the results (columns 3 and 6) show that this is indeed the case.
In the INVIND questionnaire referring to 2006, ¯rms were asked about their business
strategies, in particular about signi¯cant changes since 2000. The changes refer to signi¯cant
renewals of the product menu and to greater reliance on branding strategies. 23 We exploit
this information in two steps. First, we construct a dummy variable NEWSTRAT which is
equal to 1 when a ¯rm claims to have been either changing the product menu or investing
more resources in product branding, and 0 otherwise. As shown in columns 1 and 5 of Table
12, the dummy variable does have a signi¯cantly positive e®ect on performance; the e®ect
also survives the introduction of the share of blue-collar workers (columns 2 and 6), which
indicates that the performance improvement following the new strategy is realized on the top
of that coming from the workforce composition. More detailed information on the intensity
of the product change is then used to distinguish ¯rms that renewed products within the
same sectoral grouping (SMALLCH) from those that started producing products so new as
actually changed productive sector (LARGECH)24. The control group here consists of ¯rms
that between 2000 and 2006 kept on producing almost the same products. As shown in
columns 3 and 4 for value added growth and 7 and 8 for productivity growth, the strongest
boost to performance has come from signi¯cant changes in the product menu. As for the
blue-collar share, again we ¯nd no sectoral heterogeneity in the e®ect of product change
and branding on performance (not reported).
All in all, the evidence of this section indicates that ¯rms that undertook restructuring
23More precisely, ¯rms were asked the following question: "Which of the following statements better
describe your strategic behavior during the 2000-06 period? 1=the ¯rm has not changed strategy; 2=the
¯rm has changed strategy, mostly by introducing relevant changes in the product menu; 3=the ¯rm has
changed strategy, mostly by investing more resources on its own brand; 4=the ¯rm has changed strategy
mostly by internationalizing its activity".
24The exact question asked to the ¯rms is as follows: "With respect to your product menu in 2000, now
you produce mostly: 1=the same products; 2= slightly di®erent products that fall into a similar sectoral
category; 3= products that are so di®erent to fall into a completely di®erent sectoral category".
31activities recorded a higher growth of both value added and productivity growth. Although
more work will be required to establish a clear causal relation between restructuring and
performance, this evidence squares with and complements the results previously discussed
in the paper.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the euro has been accompanied by a process of within sector realloca-
tion, consistent with the hypothesis that the end of devaluations has forced restructuring in
the countries and sectors that had depended most heavily on them. We used productivity
growth as an indirect indicator of reallocation. This begs the question of how restructuring
actually took place. We therefore use ¯rm-level data for Italy with detailed information on
restructuring activity. A series of interviews with entrepreneurs suggested that since the
adoption of the euro ¯rms have shifted their business focus from production to upstream
and downstream activities related to R&D, product design, marketing, distribution and
post sale assistance. This search for market power has been stronger in the traditional,
low-tech industries. Hard quantitative evidence on a sample of Italian manufacturing ¯rms
showed that the process has entailed a reallocation of workers mainly within rather than
across ¯rms, with a decrease in the share of blue-collar workers. Finally, we found that
restructuring has improved performance.
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Source: our elaborations on EU KLEMS data.
























































0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Average dissimilarity index in 1998






































































0 .5 1 1.5 2
DEVNOM




































































−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
DEVREAL



































































1990 1995 2000 2005
Note: productivity is measured as log of sales per workers (left scale) in the INVIND database.
Pro¯tability is EBITDA/value added (right scale) in the Cerved database. In this and the following
graphs a vertical bar is drawn corresponding to 1999, year of the euro introduction.
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39Table 1: ICT, R&D, and skill intensities in the US and China's world market share by
sector of economic activity
Sector (NACE code in parenthesis) ICT R&D Skill Chinese
intensity intensity intensity share
Food products and beverages (15) 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.03
Tobacco products (16) 0.06 0.01 0.27 0.02
Textiles (17) 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.09
Wearing apparel, dressing (18) 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.16
Leather, leather products and footwear (19) 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.20
Wood and products of wood and cork (20) 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.03
Pulp, paper and paper products (21) 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.01
Printing, publishing and reproduction (22) 0.10 0.02 0.34 0.01
Coke, re¯ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel (23) 0.05 0.06 0.31 0.05
Chemicals and chemical products (24) 0.12 0.14 0.41 0.02
Rubber and plastics products (25) 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.06
Other non-metallic mineral products (26) 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.05
Basic metals (27) 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.03
Fabricated metal products (28) 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.05
Machinery, n.e.c. (29) 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.02
O±ce, accounting and computing machinery (30) 0.16 0.42 0.49 0.03
Electrical machinery (31) 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.04
Radio, television and communication equipment (32) 0.16 0.22 0.36 0.05
Medical, precision and optical instruments (33) 0.16 0.36 0.38 0.03
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.00
Other transport equipment (35) 0.14 0.24 0.33 0.12
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling (36, 37) 0.09 - 0.16 0.09
Correlation matrix
ICT intensity 1.0 0.7 0.6 -0.3
R&D intensity 1.0 0.8 -0.1
Skill intensity 1.0 -0.3
Chinese share 1.0
Source: Based on EU KLEMS, OECD STAN and United Nations data. Year 1998.
40Table 2: Krugman dissimilarity indices vis-a-vis the euro area
Skill intensity ICT intensity R&D intensity NACE
1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005
Euro area
Austria 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.11
Belgium 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.19
Finland 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.39
France 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.11
Germany 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.19
Greece 0.13 0.11 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.36 0.37
Ireland 0.42 0.42 0.21 0.18 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.47
Italy 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.21
Luxembourg 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.27 0.18 0.17 0.34 0.34
Netherlands 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.24
Portugal 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.29
Spain 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.15
Non-euro area
Denmark 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.19
Sweden 0.09 0.21 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.28
United Kingdom 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.15
Source: Based on EU KLEMS and STAN OECD data. Note: dissimilarity indices are calculated for
each country with respect to the EA, net of the country itself for EA members.
41Table 3: Krugman dissimilarity indices, 1998-2005
Skill intensity ICT intensity R&D intensity NACE
United Kingdom 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06
Netherlands 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06
Belgium 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
Spain 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07
Italy 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07
Portugal 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06
Ireland 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.11
Austria 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07
Denmark 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.09
Germany 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.07
France 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10
Luxembourg 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.10
Greece 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.14
Finland 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.20
Sweden 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.27
Source: Based on EU KLEMS and STAN OECD data. Note: countries are ordered according to
the indices based on skill intensity.
Table 4: Nominal and real measures of devaluation and price changes
DEVNOM DEVREAL ¢P
Austria 0.227 0.079 0.148
Belgium 0.408 0.187 0.222
Denmark 0.408 -0.042 0.450
Finland 0.432 0.109 0.323
France 0.479 0.068 0.411
Germany 0.000 0.000 0.000
Greece 1.945 0.086 1.859
Ireland 0.660 0.071 0.589
Italy 0.768 0.067 0.701
Luxembourg 0.408 0.187 0.222
Netherlands 0.185 0.167 0.018
Portugal 1.366 -0.196 1.562
Spain 0.864 0.150 0.715
Sweden 0.893 0.099 0.794
United Kingdom 0.490 -0.230 0.720
Source: Bank of Italy's calculations (see Finicelli et al. (2005)).
42Table 5: Low skill intensity and devaluations
Panel A: productivity growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEV ¤ SK ¤ EA 1.17** 1.01** 0.71 1.50*** 0.55**
(0.56) (0.40) (0.50) (0.53) (0.26)
DEV ¤ SK -0.64 -0.41* -0.23 -0.66**
(0.50) (0.23) (0.37) (0.31)
¢P ¤ SK ¤ EA -1.05**
(0.45)
¢P ¤ SK 0.58
(0.37)
ln(prod98) -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
¢prod9598 0.16** 0.16** 0.07 0.09 0.11*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06)
Observations 321 321 321 321 256
R2 0.54 0.53 0.37 0.43 0.51
Panel B: employment growth
DEV ¤ SK ¤ EA -0.19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 0.07
(0.23) (0.24) (0.27) (0.31) (0.13)
DEV ¤ SK 0.24 0.07 0.10 -0.03
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.25)
¢P ¤ SK ¤ EA 0.12
(0.23)
¢P ¤ SK -0.16
(0.19)
ln(emp98) 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01* 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¢emp9598 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.16* 0.17**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 323 323 323 323 258
R2 0.71 0.71 0.50 0.63 0.65
DEV is the indicator of nominal devaluation (DEVNOM) in column 1 and of real devaluation
(DEVREAL) in all other columns, computed over the period 1980-1998; SK is low-skill intensity;
EA is a dummy equal to 1 for the euro area countries; ¢P is the relative growth rate in producer
prices (see the main text for details); ln(prod98) (ln(emp98)) is initial productivity (employment)
and ¢prod9598 (¢emp9598) is productivity (employment) growth in the 1995-98 period. Outcome
growth rates are computed for 1998-2005 in all columns except column 4, where it is computed for
2002-05. All regressions are weighted with the sectoral employment apart from that in column 3,
which is unweighed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
43Table 6: Low R&D intensity and devaluation
Panel A: productivity growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEV ¤ RD ¤ EA 1.51** 0.62 1.63** 1.01***
(0.59) (0.52) (0.73) (0.36)
DEV ¤ RD -0.43 -0.08 -0.52
(0.34) (0.39) (0.37)
ln(prod98) -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
¢prod9598 0.16** 0.07 0.10 0.11*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06)
Observations 306 306 306 244
R2 0.56 0.38 0.46 0.54
Panel B: employment growth
DEV ¤ RD ¤ EA 0.36 0.05 0.48 0.18
(0.30) (0.24) (0.43) (0.19)
DEV ¤ RD -0.27 -0.09 -0.43
(0.20) (0.17) (0.31)
ln(emp98) 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¢emp9598 0.22*** 0.29*** 0.19** 0.17**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 308 308 308 246
R2 0.71 0.50 0.64 0.65
DEV is the indicator of real devaluation (DEVREAL), computed over the period 1980-1998; RD is
low R&D intensity; EA is a dummy equal to 1 for the EA countries; ln(prod98) (ln(emp98)) is initial
productivity (employment) and ¢prod9598 (¢emp9598) is productivity (employment) growth in the
1995-98 period. Outcome growth rates are computed for 1998-2005 in all columns except column 3,
where it is computed for 2002-05. All regressions are weighted with the sectoral employment apart
from that in column 2, which is unweighed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
44Table 7: Low ICT intensity and devaluation
Panel A: productivity growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEV ¤ ICT ¤ EA 1.64* 2.78** 1.35 0.83
(0.91) (1.34) (1.37) (0.51)
DEV ¤ ICT -0.66 -1.24 -0.68
(0.58) (0.99) (0.95)
ln(prod98) -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
¢prod9598 0.16* 0.07 0.09 0.10*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06)
Observations 321 321 321 256
R2 0.53 0.37 0.42 0.50
Panel B: employment growth
DEV ¤ ICT ¤ EA 0.29 -0.38 0.49 0.06
(0.57) (0.64) (0.65) (0.35)
DEV ¤ ICT -0.32 0.01 -0.56
(0.39) (0.46) (0.48)
ln(emp98) 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01* 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¢emp9598 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.16** 0.17**
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 323 323 323 258
R2 0.71 0.50 0.63 0.65
DEV is the indicator of real devaluation (DEVREAL), computed over the period 1980-98; ICT is
low ICT intensity; EA is a dummy equal to 1 for the EA countries; ln(prod98) (ln(emp98)) is initial
productivity (employment) and ¢prod9598 (¢emp9598) is productivity (employment) growth in the
1995-98 period. Outcome growth rates are computed for 1998-2005 in all columns except column 3,
where it is computed for 2002-05. All regressions are weighted with the sectoral employment apart
from that in column 2, which is unweighed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
45Table 8: Chinese export share and devaluation
Panel A: productivity growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEV ¤ CH ¤ EA 1.34** 1.52** 0.98 0.27
(0.67) (0.70) (1.19) (0.38)
DEV ¤ CH -1.06** -0.82 -0.97
(0.48) (0.52) (1.10)
ln(prod98) -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
¢prod9598 0.16* 0.07 0.09 0.11*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06)
Observations 321 321 321 256
R2 0.53 0.36 0.42 0.49
Panel B: employment growth
DEV ¤ CH ¤ EA -1.77** -1.01 -1.75** -0.39*
(0.69) (0.67) (0.77) (0.23)
DEV ¤ CH 1.38** 1.11*** 1.22*
(0.64) (0.41) (0.71)
ln(emp98) 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01* 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¢emp9598 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.16** 0.19***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 323 323 323 258
R2 0.73 0.51 0.64 0.65
DEV is the indicator of real devaluation (DEVREAL), computed for the period 1980-98; CH is
China's world export share; EA is a dummy equal to 1 for the EA countries; ln(prod98) (ln(emp98)) is
initial productivity (employment) and ¢prod9598 (¢emp9598) is productivity (employment) growth
in the 1995-98 period. Outcome growth rates are computed for 1998-2005 in all columns except
column 3, where it is computed for 2002-05. All regressions are weighted with the sectoral employ-
ment apart from that in column 2, which is unweighed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
46Table 9: Pre-regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SKILLS R&D ICT CHINA
PROD EMP PROD EMP PROD EMP PROD EMP
DEV ¤ SECT ¤ EA -0.11 -0.13 0.05 0.00 0.29 0.09 0.20 0.08
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.42)
DEV ¤ SECT 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18)
ln(prod80) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¢prod7080 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(emp80) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¢emp7080 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 293 302 278 287 293 302 293 302
R2 0.96 0.85 0.96 0.85 0.96 0.85 0.96 0.85
DEV is the indicator of real devaluation (DEVREAL), computed for the period 1980-98; SECT is the sectoral indicator, indicating low-skill
intensity in columns 1 and 2, low-R&D intensity in columns 3 and 4, low-ICT intensity in columns 5 and 6 and China's world export share in
columns 7 and 8; EA is a dummy equal to 1 for the EA countries; ln(prod80) (ln(emp80)) is initial productivity (employment) and ¢prod7080
(¢emp7080) is productivity (employment) growth in the 1970-80 period. Outcome growth rates are computed for 1980-98. All regressions are
weighted with sectoral employment. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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7Table 10: Share of blue-collar workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period: 1990-2007 Period: 1984-1990
LOW ¤ POST -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.072*** 0.003 0.004 0.038*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021)
MED ¡ LOW ¤ POST -0.019*** -0.059*** -0.006 0.029
(0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.021)
MED ¡ HIGH ¤ POST -0.050*** 0.036*
(0.013) (0.021)
LOW 0.076*** 0.132*** 0.336*** 0.073*** 0.127*** 0.304***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015)
MED ¡ LOW 0.135*** 0.339*** 0.135*** 0.310***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014)
MED ¡ HIGH 0.242*** 0.215***
(0.010) (0.015)
ln(emp) -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 24143 24143 24143 5142 5142 5142
R2 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.32
The dependent variable is the share of blue-collar workers at the level of the ¯rm. Ln(emp)
is the log of total employment. LOW is a dummy equal to 1 for low-tech ¯rms, and similarly
for MED-LOW and MED-HIGH. POST is a dummy equal to 1 for the post 1998 years.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
48Table 11: Firm performance and share of blue-collar workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value added growth Productivity growth
ln(emp) 0.013*** 0.016*** -0.001 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
¢ShBlue -0.022 0.017
(0.072) (0.052)
ShBlue -0.055** -0.055 -0.094*** -0.035
(0.023) (0.036) (0.020) (0.035)
Observations 3042 3178 1008 3044 3181 1009
R2 0.030 0.044 0.063 0.034 0.053 0.076
Regressions are run over the period 2000-06 except for columns 3 and 6, where the period is
1990-95. The dependent variable is the annual average real growth rate of value added/labor
productivity in the two periods. Ln(emp) is the log of total employment as of 2000. ShBlue
is the share of blue-collar workers over the total number of employees as of 2000. ¢ShBlue
is the average annual change in the share of blue-collar workers between 2000 and 2006.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
49Table 12: Firm performance and restructuring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value added growth Productivity growth
ln(emp) 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NEWSTRAT 0.016* 0.015* 0.013* 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
ShBlue -0.099*** -0.080*** -0.138*** -0.107***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022)
SMALLCH -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
LARGECH 0.119** 0.112** 0.066* 0.057*
(0.050) (0.049) (0.036) (0.032)
Observations 1989 1989 2159 2159 1987 1987 2157 2157
R2 0.043 0.060 0.058 0.067 0.050 0.087 0.060 0.081
The dependent variable is the annual average real growth rate of value added/labor productivity over the period 2000-06. Ln(emp)
is the log of total employment as of 2000. ShBlue is the share of blue-collar workers over the total number of employees as of
2000. NEWSTRAT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a ¯rm has claimed to have signi¯cantly changed its strategy over the 2000-06
period mostly by changing the product menu or investing more resources in product branding, and 0 otherwise. SMALLCH is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a ¯rm's product menu in 2006 results to be slightly (i.e., still falling in a similar sectoral grouping)
renewed with respect to what it was in 2000 and 0 otherwise. LARGECH is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a ¯rm's product menu
in 2006 results to be signi¯cantly (i.e., falling in a di®erent sectoral grouping) renewed with respect to what it was in 2000 and 0
otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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51Table A.1: Classi¯cation of NACE sectors into skill, ICT and R&D intensity classes
Sector (NACE code in parenthesis) Skill content ICT content R&D content
Food products and beverages (15) MEDIUM-LOW MEDIUM-LOW LOW
Tobacco products (16) MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-LOW LOW
Textiles (17) LOW LOW LOW
Wearing apparel, dressing (18) LOW LOW LOW
Leather, leather products and footwear (19) LOW LOW LOW
Wood and products of wood and cork (20) LOW LOW LOW
Pulp, paper and paper products (21) MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-LOW
Printing, publishing and reproduction (22) HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-LOW
Coke, re¯ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel (23) MEDIUM-HIGH LOW MEDIUM-HIGH
Chemicals and chemical products (24) HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH HIGH
Rubber and plastics products (25) MEDIUM-LOW LOW MEDIUM-HIGH
Other non-metallic mineral products (26) LOW MEDIUM-LOW MEDIUM-LOW
Basic metals (27) MEDIUM-LOW MEDIUM-LOW MEDIUM-LOW
Fabricated metal products (28) LOW MEDIUM-LOW MEDIUM-LOW
Machinery, n.e.c. (29) MEDIUM-LOW HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH
O±ce, accounting and computing machinery (30) HIGH HIGH HIGH
Electrical machinery (31) MEDIUM-HIGH HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH
Radio, television and communication equipment (32) HIGH HIGH HIGH
Medical, precision and optical instruments (33) HIGH HIGH HIGH
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH
Other transport equipment (35) MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH HIGH
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling (36, 37) MEDIUM-LOW MEDIUM-HIGH not allocated
Source: Based on EU KLEMS data.
5
2Table A.2: Descriptive statistics, dependent variables (percentage points)
Productivity growth Employment growth
Country mean median st. dev. mean median st. dev.
Austria 4.2 3.9 2.3 -1.1 -0.9 2.5
Belgium 2.2 1.9 1.5 -1.4 -1.2 1.9
Denmark 1.9 1.2 2.4 -2.9 -2.4 2.9
Finland 4.5 3.2 4.9 -0.5 -0.4 2.8
France 3.6 2.8 4.2 -1.4 -0.9 2.5
Germany 2.6 1.7 3.2 -1.2 -0.6 1.8
Greece 1.7 0.2 4.8 -1.8 -1.0 2.4
Ireland 7.5 6.0 6.2 -1.2 -0.2 4.3
Italy 0.1 0.1 2.2 -0.4 -0.2 1.5
Luxembourg 2.6 1.9 3.9 -0.5 0.6 3.2
Netherlands 3.1 2.6 2.1 -1.7 -1.2 1.8
Portugal 1.1 0.9 2.1 -1.8 -1.5 1.7
Spain 1.0 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.6
Sweden 6.6 3.4 10.1 -1.5 -1.3 1.7
United Kingdom 4.4 3.8 2.1 -4.6 -3.5 3.7
Source: Based on EU KLEMS data. Note: manufacturing sector. Average growth across sector,
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